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In this paper we study the impact of the degree of school competition on achievement of 
Italian students. Specifically, competition is measured as the number of schools available to 
students  in  a  given  area.  The  aim  is  to  evaluate  whether  an  increase  in  school  choice 
improves the quality of education. Using the third cycle of the Programme for International 
Student  Assessment  (PISA  2006)  we  investigate  with  simple  Least  Squares  regression 
models, controlling for a range of individual and schools characteristics, if secondary school 
students with a wider range of schools choices perform better than those students whose 
choice is more limited. We find a significant positive correlation between students’ academic 
performance and the degree of local schools competition. Moreover, we show that students 
achieve much better outcomes if schools operating in more competitive environments also 
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The effects of schools competition on students achievement represent a relevant topic in the 
educational literature. However, they have been mainly analyzed in the US where school choice 
may take several forms such as vouchers, charter and magnet schools (Hoxby, 2000, 2003, 
2004; Rouse, 1998; Witte, 1999; Epple and Romano, 1998; Goldhaber et al., 1999; Belfield and 
Levin, 2002). 
Specifically, a voucher is a publicly funded coupon that can be targeted at particular groups, for 
example, poor families or families of children at poorly performing schools. Students take the 
voucher to the chosen schools (which may be a public or private school) that receive a revenue 
equal to the amount of the voucher (Hoxby, 2003a).  
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Like  vouchers,  charter  and  magnet  schools  represent  a  subsidized  alternative  to  traditional 
public schools requiring an examination process or a lottery system in selecting students who 
apply  to  them.  These  types  of  schools,  surviving  through  their  ability  to  attract  sufficient 
numbers of students, can offer true competition to the regular public schools, because they can 
draw students away from poorly performing regular publics.  
A large amount of the evidence on the effects of school choice and competition on 
students outcomes predominantly explore the various alternative to traditional open enrollment 
(school voucher, charter schools and magnet schools) that, increasing the degree of competition 
faced  by  local  public  schools,  can  improve  both  schools  performance  and  students’ 
opportunities (Hoxby, 1994, 2000, 2003c; Gibbons et al. 2008). A necessary condition for these 
forms of choice to improve students’ outcomes is that those gaining access to desirable schools 
better experience academic performance than they otherwise would.  
The  existing  literature  on  the  relationship  between  school  choice  and  students 
achievement mainly comes from contexts in which competition is induced by private schools. 
Most of studies evaluate the competition effects of private school enrollment and performance 
relative to public schools (Hoxby, 2004; Epple and Romano, 1998) showing that an increase in 
school choice is related with more efficient public schools, a greater sorting of students by 
ability and positive peer effects. However, evidence focusing on the impact of school choice 
according  to  student  ability  participating  at  the  program  is  mixed.  The  impact  of  school 
competition depends on which students take advantage of the choice. From this perspective, 
Epple  and  Romano  (1998)  find  that  educational  benefits  seem  to  be  quite  unequal: 
disadvantaged students benefit disproportionately from this educational mechanism since those 
who participate are both more able and more advantaged. In particular, it emerges that typically 
only a small percentage of students take benefit of school choice and that these students tend to 
be characterized by better socio-economic background (Coleman et al., 1993; Lankford et al., 
1995; Buddin et al., 1998; Goldhaber et al., 1999).  
Another stream of research exploits randomized voucher lotteries, offered to a limited 
number of low-income students, to study the direct effects of attending private schools. Voucher 
recipients are selected from a pool of eligible applicants by a random lottery and successful 
applicants carry with them the coupon to the school of their choice. Unclear results have been 
reached also on this stream of literature: whereas some studies do not find improvement in 
achievement for voucher students (Witte et al., 1995; Green et al. 1997; Witte, 1998; Rouse, 
1998), other researches find evidence of a positive impact of the voucher program on students’ 
performance  (Cullen  et  al.,  2003;  Cullen  et  al.,  2005;  Angrist  et  al.,  2002;  Hoxby,  2003). 
Specifically Cullen et al. (2003) and Cullen et al. (2005), using evidence from the lotteries used   3
to allocate students to oversubscribed schools in the Chicago state school system, show that 
students assigned randomly into supposedly better high-schools experience modest advantage in 
terms of academic benefit. Moreover, Angrist et al. (2002) using evidence from a Colombia’s 
program  providing  vouchers  to  low-income  families,  find  that  lottery  winners  benefit  from 
higher educational attainment and reduced grade repetition. Also, according to the findings of 
Hoxby  (2003),  students  achievement  generally  rises  when  they  attend  voucher  or  charter 
schools. As a consequence, since public schools respond to the threat of losing students who use 
vouchers  to  attend  private  schools,  the  average  school  quality  across  both  sectors  rises  in 
response to an increase in competition.  
As regards competition among public schools, Hoxby (2000 and 2006, among others), 
exploits variation in the number of school districts across US metropolitan areas to investigate 
the impact of inter-district choice. She shows that greater choice among public schools leads to 
greater productivity of these schools, both in terms of better students’ educational attainment 
and lower expenditure per student. 
The Italian educational literature, analyzing the determinants of students’ performance, 
is still in its infancy and mainly focused on the role of family background and on school level 
peer effects affecting students’ performance in PISA test scores (Checchi 2004) and on the 
causes of the existence of regional disparities in secondary students’ outcomes (Checchi, 2004; 
Tramonte, 2004; Bratti, Checchi, Filippin, 2007; Montanaro, 2007). 
The current paper contributes to investigate the effects of local school competition on 
students’ performance (focusing on the Italian public school system). The degree of competition 
is based on the number of schools available for students in a given neighbourhood. Even though 
public schools are almost free and serve students from both low and high-income families, they 
enjoy vary degrees of market power that may increase the quality of schools. In a public, free 
and  compulsory  educational  system  as  the  Italian  one,  the  mechanism  through  which  local 
school competition influences school quality can be explained by the fact that public funds 
assigned to each school are related to the number of students enrolled in the school. Therefore, 
schools offering a lower quality than others bear high costs since the lower the number of 
students in these schools is, the smaller are the public resources devoted to them. Thereby 
public schools with a declining number of students enrolled face the threat of shutting down and 
its teaching staff reassigned to different schools, even in a different geographical area.  
The aim of this study is to investigate whether the degree of competition existing among 
Italian public schools in a given area improves students’ performance as measured by their 
secondary educational test scores. As far as we know, there are no other studies on the effects of 
schools competition on students achievement in Italy.   4
We use the third cycle of the Survey Programme for International Student Assessment 
(hereafter indicated as PISA), that is a three-yearly survey of the knowledge and skills of 15-
year-olds.  It  is  the  product  of  collaboration  among  participating  countries  through  the 
Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD),  and  draws  on  leading 
international expertise to develop valid comparisons across countries and cultures. More than 
400,000 students from 57 countries making up close to 90% of the world economy took part in 
PISA 2006. The main focus of the 2006 wave is on science but the assessment also includes 
reading and mathematics and the survey collects data on student’s attitudes, family background, 
school characteristics and institutional factors.  
PISA target population is defined in terms of age (15 years old students) and not in 
terms of grade level. The survey does not focus on curricular competences but on knowledge 
and skills that can be used in every day life, helping the individual to fulfil his/her potential in 
the “knowledge society”. 
The  comprehensiveness  of  PISA  dataset  allows  researchers  to  include  a  number  of 
variables that reduces the potential bias due to the omission of relevant variables typical of this 
type of studies.  
For the purpose of the analysis we define the dependent variable, Test Scores, as the 
mean of students’ performance in the fields of Reading, Mathematical and Scientific literatures. 
To  analyze  the  effect  of  school  choice  that  is,  the  degree  of  competition  among  schools 
available to students in a given area, on student’s scholastic achievement, we estimate a number 
of  simple  Least  Squares  Regression  models  controlling  for  a  wide  range  of  individual 
characteristics, family background and school variables aiming at reducing the potential bias 
due to the omitted variable. The indicator we use to investigate the degree of competition among 
schools is based on the reported number of schools of a given type available to students in a 
given area.  
Our main result is that students in secondary schools with a wide range of school choice 
in a given neighbourhood get benefits from the availability of school choice, achieving better 
academic outcomes than those living in areas with no nearby schools. Moreover, it emerges that 
students’  performance  is  particularly  high  in  contexts  in  which  a  high  degree  of  school 
competition  is  combined  with  parents  placing  very  high  pressure  on  school  to  set  higher 
academic standards.    
As expected, we also find the existence of regional disparities in students’ performance 
across Italian macro-area: students living in the Centre, South or Islands perform much worse 
than those in North-Western Italy. Additionally,  the size of the city in which a student lives, 
capturing  different  socio-economic  and  cultural  background,  significantly  affects  his/her   5
achievement: test scores of students living in large cities and metropolitan areas are significantly 
better  than  those  attending  schools  located  in  small  towns.  Moreover,  students  attending 
scientific and technical schools perform better than professional schools. Females have lower 
achievement  compared  to  males.  It  emerges  a  positive  correlation  between  students’ 
performance and household’s socio-economic background.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the PISA dataset we use and 
gives  some  descriptive  statistics.  Section  3  reports  and  discusses  several  specifications 
analyzing  the  effects  of  school  competition  on  students’  academic  outcomes.  Section  4 
concludes. 
 
2. The Data 
 
The data source we use for our empirical analysis is the survey on the Programme International 
Student  Assessment  (PISA)  developed  every  3  years  by  the  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). PISA is a system of international assessments focusing 
on 15-year-olds’ capabilities in reading literacy, mathematics literacy, and science literacy. Each 
country includes assessments of all three subjects, but assesses one of the subjects in depth. We 
use in this paper the third wave of PISA which refers to data collected in 2006 mainly focused 
on measuring performance on science literacy. The PISA contains a rich set of information on 
students’, parents’ and schools characteristics
1. The latter are collected through a questionnaire 
completed by school principals.  
The Italian sample includes 21,773 students at the age of 15 tested in 806 schools. It is 
stratified for macro-geographical areas (North West, North East, Centre, South and Island) and 
for type of secondary schools attended (Lyceums, Technical schools and Vocational institutes). 
We define the dependent variable, Test Scores, as the mean of students’ performance in the 
fields of Reading, Mathematics and Science.  
The question we use to define our variable of interest as judged by schools principals is 
the  following:  “Which  of  the  following  statements  best  describe  the  schooling  available to 
students in your location?” The possible answers are listed below: 1) there are two or more 
other schools in this area that compete for our students; 2) there is one other school in this area 
that competes for our students; 3) there are no other schools in this area that compete for our 
students. Using this question, we define two dummy variables: 1) competition coming from two 
or more schools and 2) competition with another school (the omitted category is absence of 
competition).  
                                                 
1 PISA data are freely available at www.pisa.oecd.org.   6
In an important number of cases, information on parents’ and schools backgrounds are missing 
values. Our final sample includes 18,265 observations. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The 
mean value of Test Scores is 479.26 with a standard deviation of 89.53. As regards the degree of 
competition among schools, about 66% of the schools in our sample are involved in competition 
with two or more other schools while 13% of them compete with another school. About 20% of 
schools face no competition. Students attending private schools are 6.4%. The average school 
size (given by the total number of boys and girls enrolled) is 662.83. The variable Parents 
Pressure represents the parental pressure on schools with regards to academic standards. On the 
basis  of  schools  statements  we  define  two  dummy  variables:  Very  High  Pressure  if  many 
parents press on school to achieve higher academic standards and  ormal Pressure coming 
from a minority of parents, whereas Absence of Parents Pressure is the reference category. 
About 20% of parents places very high pressure on school to set higher academic standard while 




Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs 
Test Scores  479.263  89.527  76.333  732.618  21773 
Mathematics Scores  473.628  92.290  7.563  895.225  21773 
Reading Scores  477.008  102.626  1.020  1078.888  21773 
Science Scores  487.153  93.266  95.989  800.566  21773 
           
School Characteristics           
Competition with two or more 
schools  
0.661  0.473  0  1  21106 
Competition with one other school  0.131  0.338  0  0  21106 
Absence of competition  0.207  0.405  0  1  21106 
Private school  0.064  0.244  0  1  21622 
School size  662.831  419.982  9  2536  20810 
Parents pressure: very high  0.200  0.400  0  1  20919 
Parents pressure: normal  0.567  0.495  0  1  20919 
Parents pressure: absent  0.232  0.422  0  1  20919 
                 
Student Characteristics           
Female  0.498  0.500  0  1  21773 
Lyceum  0.397  0.489  0  1  21773 
Technical school  0.321  0.467  0  1  21773 
Vocational and Other schools  0.282  0.450  0  1  21773 
Grade (school year level)  9.847  0.408  9  11  21597 
Immigrate student  0.107  0.309  0  1  21773 
Total hours self study per week  12.861  6.971  0  32  20907 
 orth West  0.226  0.418  0  1  21773 
 orth East  0.389  0.488  0  1  21773 
Centre  0.038  0.190  0  1  21773   7
South  0.144  0.351  0  1  21773 
Islands  0.204  0.403  0  1  21773 
Village (< 3,000 people)  0.024  0.152  0  1  21300 
Small town (3,000 15,000)  0.236  0.425  0  1  21300 
Town (15,000 100,000)  0.487  0.500  0  1  21300 
City (100,000 1,000,000)  0.211  0.408  0  1  21300 
Large city (over 1,000,000)  0.042  0.201  0  1  21300 
 
Family Background Characteristics 
Parents education (in years)  12.388  3.465  0  18  21554 
Father white collar   0.529  0.499  0  1  21095 
Father blue collar   0.426  0.495  0  1  21095 
Father unemployed  0.044  0.206  0  1  21095 
Mother white collar   0.534  0.499  0  1  21773 
Mother blue collar   0.156  0.362  0  1  21773 
Mother unemployed  0.310  0.463  0  1  21773 
Index of home possessions  0.000  1.634  -10.837  2.426  20844 
Books at home (0 10)  0.083  0.276  0  1  21525 
Books at home (11 25)  0.166  0.372  0  1  21525 
Books at home (26 100)  0.329  0.470  0  1  21525 
Books at home (101 200)  0.202  0.401  0  1  21525 
Books at home (201 500)  0.137  0.344  0  1  21525 
Books at home >500  0.083  0.275  0  1  21525 
Data source: PISA 2006. 
 
 
Females make up 50% of the sample. Students mainly came from three different types of high 
schools: Lyceums (about 40%), Technical (32%) and Vocational/Other schools (about 28%)
2. 
The average number of hours studied per week is 12.86.  
Students living in the North-West constitute 23% of the population, those residing in the 
North-East are 39% while 4% lives in the Centre, 14% in the South and 20% on the Islands
3. 
Schools are located in five different types of community: village or rural area (below 3,000 
inhabitants)  that  make  up  2.4%  of  the  sample,  small  town  with  3,000  to  about  15,000 
inhabitants (24%), town with 15,000 to about 100,000 inhabitants (49%), city with 15,000 to 
about 100,000 inhabitants (21%) and large city with over 1,000,000 inhabitants (4.2%). 
Education  of  parents  represents  the  number  of  years  of  schooling.  It  is  set  at  0  for  no 
educational  qualification;  5  for  elementary  school;  8  for  middle  school;  11  for  some  high 
school; 13 for high school; 18 for university. The average number of years of parents schooling 
                                                 
2 The Italian secondary school system can be described as tripartite, with an academic oriented generalist 
education provided by high schools (5 years, called licei, with further division in humanities, sciences, 
languages, pedagogy), a technically oriented education provided by technical schools (5 years, called 
istituti tecnici, with further differentiations according to the type of job), and a vocational training offered 
by local schools organized at regional level (5 years, called istituti di formazione professionale). 
3 North-West includes the following regions: Piedmont, Lombardy, Liguria; North-East includes Veneto, 
Trento and Bolzano, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna; Centre includes Tuscany, Lazio, Marche, 
Umbria;  South  includes  Campania,  Apulia,  Molise,  Basilicata,  Calabria;  Islands  includes  Sicily  and 
Sardinia.   8
in the sample is 12. Nearly 33% of families has 26-100 books, 17% has 11-25 books and 8% 
has less than 10 books. 
 
3. An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between School 
Competition and Student Achievement 
 
In this Section in order to analyze the relationship between students’ academic achievement and 
the degree of competition among schools, we estimate a number of Least Square Regressions. 
We  adopt  an  “incremental”  approach  by  estimating  different  specifications  in  which  we 
progressively add new control variables.  
  Our estimates are based on the following educational production function: 
(1)             ij ij j ij j ij ij E S F n Competitio Schools X Y ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 _  
where  ij Y  is the Test Scores achieved by student i at school j,  ij X  is a vector of  individual 
characteristics,  j n Competitio Schools_   describes  the  availability  of  schools  to  students,  a 
measure of the number of competitors of school  j,  ij F  is a vector of variables capturing family 
background characteristics,  j S  is a vector of school characteristics,  ij E  describes the time spent 
per week studying or doing homework by students and  ij ε  is an error term.  
  Results of our estimations are reported in Table 2. In the second part of the analysis 
(Table 3), to better evaluate our findings we show further specifications in which we separately 
use Mathematics, Reading and Science literacy scores as dependent variables instead of the 
mean of the three fields. In all equations sample weights provided in the PISA dataset are used. 
The reported standard errors are robust to the heteroskedasticity and corrected for the potential 
clustering of the residual at the school level. 
In  order  to  evaluate  whether  an  increase  in  school  competition  improves  students’ 
performance, we use the two dummy variables capturing the degree of competition for each 
school as judged by the school principals: 1) competition coming from two schools or more; 2) 
competition with one other school (absence of competition represents the reference category). 
 











Competition with two or more schools  4.304**  5.150***  5.073***  5.488*** 
  (1.942)  (1.925)  (1.925)  (1.940) 
Competition with one other school  2.033  2.050  2.992  2.908 
  (2.918)  (2.644)  (2.582)  (2.599) 
Female  -11.335***  -11.059***  -11.122***  -11.063***   9
  (1.400)  (1.424)  (1.423)  (1.450) 
Lyceum  99.941***  97.843***  98.070***  86.453*** 
  (1.955)  (2.091)  (2.080)  (2.296) 
Technical school  58.348***  57.386***  57.630***  52.948*** 
  (1.903)  (1.903)  (1.891)  (1.976) 
Grade  42.602***  40.878***  40.894***  36.324*** 
  (1.814)  (1.867)  (1.864)  (1.929) 
Immigrate student  -10.696***  -10.934***  -10.885***  -8.347*** 
  (2.316)  (2.362)  (2.362)  (2.396) 
Total hours self study  per week  1.168***  1.126***  1.120***  0.949*** 
  (0.100)  (0.101)  (0.101)  (0.102) 
 orth East  15.774***  14.959***  14.998***  13.847*** 
  (1.654)  (1.645)  (1.644)  (1.637) 
Centre  -24.310***  -26.520***  -26.501***  -26.823*** 
  (2.598)  (2.605)  (2.601)  (2.622) 
South  -64.410***  -66.607***  -66.523***  -58.806*** 
  (1.810)  (1.850)  (1.851)  (1.933) 
Islands  -77.655***  -79.257***  -79.248***  -72.476*** 
  (2.022)  (2.051)  (2.051)  (2.136) 
Small town (3,000 15,000)  20.192***  20.499***  20.703***  22.494*** 
  (5.446)  (7.633)  (7.586)  (8.546) 
Town (15,000 100,000)  23.495***  22.830***  23.027***  25.669*** 
  (5.364)  (7.571)  (7.521)  (8.499) 
City (100,000 1,000,000)  25.139***  23.052***  23.130***  25.008*** 
  (5.450)  (7.663)  (7.613)  (8.587) 
Large city (over 1,000,000)  29.734***  28.399***  28.010***  28.562*** 
  (5.982)  (8.030)  (7.977)  (8.910) 
Private school    -32.760***  -32.437***  -34.230*** 
    (4.079)  (4.093)  (4.109) 
School size    0.009***  0.009***  0.007*** 
    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Parents pressure: very high    7.724***  7.003***  5.387** 
    (2.314)  (2.319)  (2.328) 
Parents pressure: normal    4.740***  3.373*  1.924 
    (1.790)  (1.897)  (1.934) 
High parents pressure*(competition 
with two or more schools) 
   
8.989**  7.630* 
      (4.354)  (4.397) 
Parents education (in years)        0.788*** 
        (0.216) 
Father white collar        11.345*** 
        (3.617) 
Father blue collar        11.145*** 
        (3.594) 
Mother white collar        10.692*** 
        (1.800) 
Mother blue collar        11.253*** 
        (2.237) 
Index of home possessions        2.185*** 
        (0.584) 
Books at home (11 25)        9.566*** 
        (3.273) 
Books at home (26 100)        16.985*** 
        (3.223) 
Books at home (101 200)        25.448*** 
        (3.513) 
Books at home (201 500)        33.907*** 
        (3.705) 
Books at home >500        35.148*** 
        (4.271) 
         
Constant  -14.489  -3.914     -3.378  5.599 
  (18.452)  (19.812)  (19.770)  (21.242) 
           10
Observations  20906  19879  19879  18265 
R squared  0.461  0.475  0.475  0.491 
Pseudo R squared  -116593  -110673  -110668  -101003 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions. The dependent variable is Test Scores. Standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity) 
are reported in parentheses. The standard errors are corrected for the potential clustering at the school level.  The symbols ***, 
**, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Sample weights are used. 
Data source: PISA 2006. 
 
 
Column  (1)  shows  the  estimated  coefficients  in  a  model  in  which  we  only  use  individual 
characteristics, macro-geographical variables and city size dummies.  
The main findings are as follows. Estimation results show that the presence of two or more 
other schools that compete for students in a given area produce an increase of student test 
scores,  implying  that  in  an  area  with  more  intense  competition,  students  increase  their 
performance of about 4.3 points. The coefficient is significant at the 5% level. This finding 
suggests that a greater degree of competition among schools, implying a larger choice amongst 
potential students, may raise schools productivity through an increase in teachers’ effort and 
school efficiency. As a consequence, students tend to perform better if they are enrolled in 
schools  that  serve  more  competitive  markets.  However,  it  seems  that  the  competition  with 
another school is not sufficient to increase student’s performance, in fact the coefficient is not 
significantly different from the reference category. In this case the competition threat associated 
with one extra school available to students is weaker. 
Controlling  for  individual  factors  it  emerges  that  female  students  have  lower 
educational achievements. The difference with respect to male students amounts to about 11 
points. This difference changes only slightly in the specifications including further controls. 
Additionally, students attending a Lyceum (Scientific and Humanities High schools) perform 
much better (99.94) than those coming from Vocational and Other schools (reference group). 
Besides, students attending Technical schools perform better than those in Vocational schools 
even if the impact on test scores is not as strong as those of students in Scientific/Humanities 
schools (58.35). The advantage of students attending Lyceum may capture both an effect of 
students’ ability or family socio economic conditions (typically, Italian students with better 
family  background  enrol  in  Lyceum).  The  variables  related  to  students’  socio-economic 
background will be discussed afterwards. 
In column (1) we also include a variable accounting for the total hours spent per week in 
self study. It is derived from students’ reports on the amount of time they devote to do their 
homework on Reading, Mathematics, Science and in other subjects. One more hour devoted to 
self study leads to a better students’ performance (1.16 points), significantly at the 1% level.  
Since  our  measure  of  competition  may  also  capture  urban  density,  exploiting  the 
available data that are rich in geographical details, we also control for macro-regional dummies   11
and for the size of the cities. In particular, geographical dummy variables may capture broader 
socio-economic conditions of different regional labour markets. Individuals living in areas with 
a bad functioning labour market (South and Islands in Italy) experience higher unemployment 
rate. The presence of this factor and the distortions affecting labour markets (see De Paola and 
Scoppa, 2007) may discourage students to invest in human capital. As expected, the coefficients 
on the macro-area dummies (South and Islands) show a huge negative sign. Students living in 
the South perform about 64 points worse compared to the North-West (reference category), 
while even worse educational achievements are obtained by students in Islands (-73.65). On the 
other hand, it is interesting to note that the performance of students in North-East Italy is by far 
the highest (+15.77) one. All coefficients are significant at the 1% level and the magnitude 
remains almost the same across the different specifications. Given the centralised structure of 
the  Italian  educational  system,  the  presence  of  these  large  geographical  differences  across 
macro-areas in student achievements is particularly striking.   
In column (1) we also add as control variables City Size dummies to take into account 
the fact that larger cities tend to be associated with a greater endowment of human capital and, 
as a consequence, more prone to generate externalities favouring the accumulation of skills. All 
coefficients of city-size dummies show positive and significant effects on students’ performance 
(the reference category is Small town with 3,000 or less inhabitants). Test Scores of students 
attending schools located in town, cities, large cities and metropolitan areas differ significantly 
from  the  performance  of  students  attending  schools  located  in  villages.  Living  in  a  city 
(100,000-1,000,000  inhabitants)  increases  the  educational  achievement  by  25.14  points 
compared to the reference category. The finding of a considerable positive effect is stronger in 
metropolitan areas (equal to 29.73) even if it is plausible to think that in small towns a limited 
number of schools is available whereas in large cities students are able to choose from a wide 
range of schools. Therefore, it is difficult to attribute the effect of large cities on student’s 
performance to the degree of competition, since small and large cities differ for a number of 
contextual and socio-economic factors.  
In model (2) of Table 2 we take into account some school characteristics. Students 
attending private schools show worse performance than those in public schools. The effect is 
huge (being student in a private school reduces educational achievement of 32.76 points) and 
significant at the 1 percent level. The finding can be illustrated in terms of characteristics of 
private  schools  in  Italy,  perceived  as  remedial  schools  for  low  skilled  students  from  more 
advantaged social background (see Brunello and Rocco, 2008).  
In addition, it emerges that students enrolled at schools with larger size have better 
educational achievements (an increase of 100 in the school size improves students’ tests scores   12
of 0.9 points). The coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level. However, this effect should be 
interpreted with caution since it could represent the presence of an inverse causality relationship 
among school size and student’s performance due to the fact that schools of better quality attract 
students.  
In column (2) we also include two dummy variables: Very High Parents’ Pressure and 
 ormal Parents’ Pressure, taking into account the pressure of parents on school with regards to 
academic standards. From our analysis it emerges that both coefficients of Parental pressure 
improve students’ performance. The positive coefficient indicates that in a context in which 
parents place very high pressure on school to set a higher academic standard, students test 
scores significantly increase by 7.72 points compared to the reference category (Absence of 
Parents  Pressure).  Similarly,  pressure  coming  from  a  minority  of  parents  on  school  has  a 
positive effect on students test scores (4.74 points). Both coefficients are significant at the 1 
percent level. Since parental pressure on academic standard increases student’s performance, in 
column (3), we interact the dummy Very High Parent Pressure with our variable of interest 
(Competition with two or more schools). Results show that in contexts in which schools operate 
in more competitive markets and also parents put pressure on school to set a higher academic 
standard, students achievement significantly increases. Therefore, the degree of competition is 
particularly useful when parents are interested in their children education. 
In the last specification (column 4) we include several controls for family background. 
It  is  common  that  students  with  better  socio  economic  background  tend  to  have  better 
educational  resources  and  obtain  higher  academic  outcomes.  In  fact,  in  our  analysis  the 
educational level (in years) achieved by  students’ parents is strongly positively related to the 
students’  educational  performance.
4  Besides,  the  dummy  variables  accounting  for  parental 
occupational  conditions  (White  collar/Blue  collar  classification)  have  a  strong  and  highly 
significant effect on student’s performance (the base category is father/mother not employed).  
As  expected,  the  household  possessions,  derived  from  students’  reports  on  the 
availability of resources in their home (for example a quiet place where to study, a desk to 
study, number of software, Internet connection, classic literature, books of poetry, a dishwasher, 
DVD or VCR  player etc.) have a positive effect on students’ performance. The coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1% level
5.  
                                                 
4 To take into account human capital externalities among peers, we have also included in the analysis the 
average years of schooling of parents of all the students enrolled at the school but the coefficient does not 
turn out as a significant determinant of students test scores (not reported). 
5 The variable Family Wealth was not included in estimations to avoid problem of collinearity because of 
the very high correlation with the index of home possessions (0.62). However, including Family Wealth 
instead of Home Possession leads to very similar results.       13
Finally, it emerges that the cultural capital measured by the number of books at family 
home, is positively associated with student test scores. The dummy variables accounting for the 
number  of  books  at  the  student’s  home  are  five.
6  An  increase  in  the  number  of  books  is 
associated with better students’ performance. Students having more than 500 books at family 
home achieve much better academic outcomes (35.15 points) than those who have lower books 
availability at home (0-10 books (reference category)).  
Notwithstanding the fact that, in the latter specifications, we are controlling for a host of 
factors  which  are  correlated  with  student  educational  attainment,  we  find  evidence  that 
attendance at a school that faces more competition improves student achievement. In particular, 
the competition threat associated with two or more extra schools available to students in a given 
area, increases students test scores of about 5.5 points, significantly at the 1 percent level. A 
possible interpretation of this finding is that a greater degree of school competition, leading to a 
greater choice amongst potential students, also tends to improve schools productivity in terms of 
efficiency and, as a consequence, students educational achievement.  
To better evaluate our findings we show in Table 3 further specifications in which we 
separately use Mathematics, Reading and Science literacy scores as dependent variables instead 
of Test Scores. In these specifications we consider all the variables entered in the model 4 of 
Table  2  to  study  the  relationship  between  student’s  academic  performance  (respectively  in 
Mathematics, Reading and Science) and the degree of competition among schools.  
 












       
Competition with two or more schools  6.964***  7.075***  2.427 
  (2.132)  (2.515)  (2.114) 
Competition with one other school  1.287  3.340  2.033 
  (3.971)  (5.287)  (2.918) 
Female  -33.448***  21.999***  -21.738*** 
  (1.565)  (1.844)  (1.588) 
Lyceum  76.154***  102.373***  80.832*** 
  (2.438)  (2.942)  (2.487) 
Technical school  51.269***  59.621***  47.953*** 
  (2.071)  (2.616)  (2.108) 
Grade  38.813***  34.957***  35.201*** 
  (2.059)  (2.553)  (2.084) 
Immigrate student  -6.247**  -8.127**  -10.667*** 
  (2.618)  (3.182)  (2.746) 
Total hours self study  per week  0.962***  0.908***  0.976*** 
  (0.110)  (0.125)  (0.114) 
 orth East  16.683***  9.741***  15.116*** 
  (1.773)  (1.903)  (1.798) 
Centre  -31.542***  -23.108***  -25.820*** 
                                                 
6 0 to 10 books at the student’s home (reference category),  11 to 25,  26 to 100, 101 to 200, 201 to 500 
and  more than 500.   14
  (2.763)  (3.343)  (2.944) 
South  -54.360***  -59.881***  -62.177*** 
  (2.125)  (2.368)  (2.072) 
Islands  -72.783***  -72.404***  -72.240*** 
  46.142***  32.189**  37.239*** 
Small town (3,000 15,000)  (2.531)  (8.467)  (2.643) 
  45.777***  41.680***  39.367*** 
Town (15,000 100,000)  (1.057)  (4.923)  (2.233) 
  46.223***  38.300***  39.023*** 
City (100,000 1,000,000)  (3.266)  (1.994)  (1.919) 
  59.552***  42.039**  40.900*** 
Large city (over 1,000,000)  (4.967)  (13.269)  (6.294) 
  46.142***  32.189**  37.239*** 
Private school  -36.846***  -25.637***  -40.208*** 
  (4.801)  (4.766)  (4.266) 
School size  0.005**  0.008***  0.009*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Parents pressure: very high  9.341***  5.423*  1.399 
  (2.531)  (2.851)  (2.575) 
Parents pressure: normal  -0.215  6.087**  -0.099 
  (2.048)  (2.543)  (2.080) 
High parents pressure*(competition with two or 
more schools)  7.570*  5.045  10.275** 
  (4.554)  (5.861)  (4.780) 
Parents education (in years)  0.840***  0.824***  0.699*** 
  (0.232)  (0.287)  (0.236) 
Father white collar  8.781**  14.794***  10.460*** 
  (3.909)  (4.885)  (4.036) 
Father blue collar  7.729**  14.514***  11.192*** 
  (3.872)  (4.895)  (3.971) 
Mother white collar  10.176***  10.313***  11.588*** 
  (1.937)  (2.264)  (2.004) 
Mother blue collar  11.169***  11.993***  10.597*** 
  (2.385)  (2.889)  (2.407) 
Index of home possessions  2.388***  1.790**  2.377*** 
  (0.611)  (0.760)  (0.627) 
Books at home (11 25)  9.089***  14.146***  5.464 
  (3.318)  (4.326)  (3.511) 
Books at home (26 100)  14.201***  22.784***  13.969*** 
  (3.221)  (4.216)  (3.434) 
Books at home (101 200)  21.636***  29.460***  25.250*** 
  (3.559)  (4.522)  (3.792) 
Books at home (201 500)  32.579***  33.356***  35.785*** 
  (3.819)  (4.711)  (4.015) 
Books at home >500  35.399***  30.634***  39.411*** 
  (4.480)  (5.377)  (4.599) 
       
Constant  4.226  -37.202  49.774** 
  (22.736)  (27.828)  (22.757) 
       
Observations  18265  18265  18265 
R squared  0.435  0.441  0.444 
Pseudo R squared  -102557  -104766  -102644 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions. The dependent variables are Mathematics Test Scores (column 1), Reading 
Test Scores (column 2), Science Test Scores (column 3). Standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity) are reported in 
parentheses. The standard errors are corrected for the potential clustering at the school level.  The symbols ***, **, * 
indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Sample weights are 
used. Data source: PISA 2006. 
 
 
As regards our variable of interest, the estimated effect of the degree of competition 
between  two  or  more  schools  increases  the  performance  of  students  on  Mathematics  and   15
Readings subjects of about 6.96 and 7.07 points respectively (significantly at the 1 percent 
level). However, the existence of this intense competition among schools does not appear to be 
a  relevant  determinant  of students test  score in  Science literacy.  Moreover, it  emerges  that 
competition  with  another  school  does  not  significantly  differ  from  the  reference  category 
(Absence of Competition).  
Some  of  the  estimated  coefficients  change  in  size  but  they  are  broadly  similar  to 
previous specifications. The coefficients of city-size dummies show positive and significant 
effects on students achievement in Mathematics, in Reading and in Science. Students attending 
schools located  in a  city  (100,000-1,000,000  inhabitants)  perform  in  Mathematics  about 46 
points (38 and 39 points in Reading and Science) better than those attending schools located in 
villages (the reference category). The effect of a considerable positive effect is stronger for 
students living in metropolitan areas (equal to 60, 42 and 41 points respectively).  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this study we have attempted to explore the effects of schools competition on the test scores 
of 15 years old students in Italy as reported in the PISA 2006 survey. Specifically, we have 
investigated if secondary school students with a wider range of school choices perform better 
than  those  whose  choice  is  more  limited.  Thereby,  we  have  used  the  number  of  schools 
available to students in a local area to gauge the degree of competition. 
Controlling for a wide range of individual and school characteristics, our results show a 
positive  association  between  the  degree  of  school  competition  and  student  academic 
performance: students enrolled in schools operating in more competitive environments (two or 
more other schools in a given area that compete for students) achieve better performance than 
those  who  have  less  choice  (since  there  are  no  other  schools  competing  in  the  area  or 
competition is limited to only another school). This aspect appears to be mainly relevant for 
students’ performance in Mathematics and Reading subjects. Although, the Italian educational 
system is public and free, competition among schools improves students’ performance. The 
mechanism through which local school competition influences school quality can be explained 
by the fact that public funds are related to the number of students enrolled in a given school. 
Thereby, schools offering a lower educational quality compared to others lose students and with 
a lower number of students enrolled, they obtain a smaller percentage of public funds. 
Furthermore, from our analysis it appears that students achievement increases if schools 
operating in more competitive markets also bear a higher pressure coming from parents with 
regards to academic standards.    16
As  regards  other  relevant  findings  of  our  investigation,  it  emerges  that  students  in 
Southern Italy perform significantly worse than those in the North. A possible cause of this 
result may be due to the presence of distortions affecting labour market that may discourage 
students to invest in effective skills. Moreover, the performance of students living in cities and 
metropolitan areas are significantly better than those attending schools located in small towns. 
Perhaps, this result is also due to the fact that students attending school in larger cities get 
benefit from the availability of school choice, achieve better academic outcomes than those who 
live in areas with no nearby schools. However, other explanations cannot be excluded since 
larger  cities  are  also  endowed  with  better  human  capital  and  with  better  resources  for 
educational purposes.  
In accordance with the existing literature, we also find support by the fact that family 
background  such  as  parents’  education,  parental  occupational  status  and  home  possessions 
related  to  both  family  wealth  and  culture  capital  are  positively  correlated  with  students’ 
performance.   
From  a  policy  perspective,  the  findings  that  students  tend  to  do  better  if  they  are 
enrolled in schools operating in more competitive contexts highlight the general effectiveness in 
terms  of  allocative  efficiency  in  the  use  of  resources.  Thereby,  implementing  systematic 
competition within local public schools promotes the quality of education and improves student 
outcomes, constituting an efficient form of discipline for low quality neighbourhood schools. 
With greater choice, students may be able to enrol at a school that better suits their preferences 
and schools tend to improve their productivity since if they are not efficient they risk to lose 
students and public funds.  
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